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Nonunion Employees and the Weingarten Right
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")I is
to ease the industrial strife which burdens and obstructs the free
flow of commerce. 2 In order to attain this goal, the NLRA seeks
to eliminate the disparity in bargaining power between employ-
ers and employees by granting employees the right to freely
associate and independently contract with one another.3 Section
7,4 the core of the NLRA,5 provides workers with the right to
"engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ."6 Section 7
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2. Id. § 151. Section 151 states that industrial strife affects commerce by:
(a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of
commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting,
restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or pro-
cessed goods from or into the channels of commerce; or (d) causing diminution
of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt
the market for goods from or into the channels of commerce.
Id.
3. Id. Many employees fall beyond the scope of the NLRA. Section 152(3) states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substan-
tially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway
Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
Id. § 152(3).
4. Id. § 157.
5. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1974).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Not all concerted activities are protected under the NLRA.
Unprotected activities include: intermittent work stoppages, UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 252-65 (1949); unlawful activity, Southern S.S.
Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 48 (1942); violent activity, Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 529
F.2d 1225, 1234 (5th Cir. 1976); disloyal activity, NLRB v. Local 1229, International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 465-78 (1953); and disruptive activity, Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 604-06 (1st Cir. 1979). See generally Johnson, Protected Con-
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guarantees are equally applicable to union and nonunion
employees. 7
In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court held that
section 7 guarantees a union 9 employee the right to a union
representative in an investigatory interview in which an em-
ployer confronts the employee with allegations of employee mis-
conduct.10 Two requirements must be met before the Weingarten
right is triggered. First, the employee must request the presence
certed Activity Non-Union Context: Limitations on Employers Rights to Discipline or
Discharge Employees, 49 MISS. L.J. 839 (1978).
7. The Supreme Court first enunciated this principle in NLRB v. Washington Alumi-
num Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (the action of seven nonunion employees who left work
without permission in protest of the cold temperatures in their work place held to be
protected concerted activity).
Circuit courts have recognized the principle in a wide variety of factual contexts. See,
e.g., Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 622 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1980) (nonunion employee's
walk protesting unfair job assignments found protected concerted activity); NLRB v.
Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977) (nonunion employee soliciting support for
collective refusal to work held protected concerted activity); United Merchants & Mfrs. v.
NLRB, 554 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1977) (work stoppage by nonunion employees protesting
discharges found protected concerted activity); United Packinghouse, Food & Allied
Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.) (nonunion employees
acting to establish racially integrated employment conditions held protected concerted
activity), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, 293 F.2d 941
(1st Cir. 1961) (unorganized employees protesting discharges found to be protected con-
certed activity).
Likewise, decisions of the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") have also
extended section 7b guarantees to nonunion employees in diverse factual settings. See,
e.g., Red Ball Motor Freight, 253 N.L.R.B. 871 (1980) (employee complaints concerning
company's procedures found protected); Go-Lightly Footwear, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 42 (1980)
(walkout by employees supporting discharged employees and picketing protesting em-
ployer premises, scab labor, and minority issues held protected); Savin Business Mach.
Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. 92 (1979) (employee discussions concerning commission losses found
protected); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350 (1978) (employee's attempt to organize
other employees to walk out held protected).
There is, however, one very limited exception. The NLRA does not protect concerted
activity of minority employees who seek to bargain with the employer when these
employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,70 (1975).
The term "union employee" is used herein to indicate an employee who is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement.
8. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
9. A union is a labor organization. The NLRA defines "labor organization" as: "[Any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
10. In the usual scenario, the employer calls the employee to the interview to learn the
employee's version of the circumstances surrounding the employee's alleged misconduct.
On the basis of the interview and any supplemental information, the employer makes a
decision concerning discipline.
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of a union representative at the interview.1' Second, the employee
must reasonably believe that the interview will result in discipli-
nary action.' 2 In Weingarten, the Court also defined the scope of
the right. The representative, functioning as a professional,
actively participates in the hearing. He or she may clarify facts
or suggest speaking to other employees who may possess rele-
vant facts.13 The employer, however, need not bargain with the
representative. 4 Moreover, the employee's exercise of this right
must not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. 5 An
11. The employee waives this right if he fails to request a representative at the inter-
view. The employee can either waive the right knowingly if he is aware of the right and
chooses to forego representation, or unintentionally if he fails to exercise the right
because he is unaware of it. See NLRB v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 584 F.2d 360, 362
(10th Cir. 1978).
The employer has the prerogative of presenting the employee with the choice between
having the interview without a representative or foregoing the interview. Once the
employee waives the right to have a representative present, the employer may continue
the interview process without committing an unfair labor practice. See Weingarten, 420
U.S. at 257.
12. The employee's reasonable belief is measured by an objective standard, based on
the circumstances of the case. The employee's subjective motives are irrelevant. Rea-
sonableness is a question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. Weingarten, 420 U.S.
at 258 n.5.
The Board, in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), stated:
[W]e would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-floor conversations
as, for example, the giving of instructions or training or needed corrections of
work techniques. In such cases there cannot normally be any reasonable basis
for an employee to fear that any adverse impact may result from the interview,
and thus we would then see no reasonable basis for him to seek the assistance
of his representative.
Id. at 199.
13. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260, 262-65. The Court recognized that the union represen-
tative aids the employee because the representative is knowledgeable in the mechanics
and negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and experienced in dealing with
employers. The representative assists the employee, who may be overwhelmed by the
employer.
The Court noted that an employer may be all the more intimidating as a result of the
recent, growth in sophisticated surveillance techniques. The employer can monitor and
investigate the employee's conduct through the use of closed circuit television, lie detec-
tors, and undercover security agents. This raises the question of whether an employee
can bring into the interview a co-employee who is neither trained to serve in the capacity
of a representative nor familiar with the sophisticated surveillance devices used by
employers. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
14. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.
15. Id. at 258. The Supreme Court in Weingarten did not define the concept of "legiti-
mate employer prerogatives." By way of example, however, the Court stated that one
such prerogative gives the employer the freedom to conduct an investigation without
interviewing the employee. Other employer prerogatives must be determined from the
common law. Employer authority has been recognized for discharging at will, hiring
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employee's denial of this right to have a representative present
at the hearing constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 16 This section empowers the National
Labor Relations Board ("the Board") to take action against the
employer in the event of an unfair labor practice.17
It is not clear whether section 7 affords nonunion employees
the Weingarten right.18 In Material Research Corp.,1 9 the Board
held that the right to representation at an investigatory inter-
view applies to nonunion employees because section 7 protects
nonunion as well as union employees.20 Conversely, the Ninth
Circuit, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. NLRB, 21 held that in a
nonunion setting, an individual's request for representation is
not concerted activity within the meaning of section 7, and thus
the Weingarten right is not applicable to nonunion employees. 22
standards, setting up working hours, and disciplining employees. See infra text accom-
panying notes 78-92.
16. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 251. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides that "[it shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 [section 7]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1982).
17. Section 10(a) authorizes the Board to take action; it states in pertinent part: '"he
Board is empowered... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
... affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
Section 10(c) outlines the scope of the available remedies: "an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this subchapter." Id. § 160(c).
Section 10(e) allows the Board to petition the federal court in the jurisdiction in which
the unfair labor practice occurred for the enforcement of their order. Id. § 160(e).
Section 10(f) grants a person aggrieved by the Board's order the same right as the
Board has to petition the court to review the order. Id. § 160(f).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 93-123.
19. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).
20. Id. at 1010.
21. 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983).
22. Id. at 1079. The Fifth Circuit has also expressed an unwillingness to extend the
Weingarten right to nonunion employees. In Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153
(5th Cir. 1980), the court held that an employee's request for representation by a union
which had won a challenged election was protected by section 7. The court found the
employee's request to be concerted activity because the union stood for all the unit
employees. The court explained that, absent the union, the presence of a union represen-
tative does not satisfy the Interboro view of the definition of concerted activity.
We conclude that before a representation election is held, the presence of a
union representative does not have the effect on other employees essential to
satisfaction of the Interboro standard for concerted activity [the most lenient
standard,] thus the employee's activity in seeking the presence of a representa-
tive at that time does not constitute concerted activity.
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Resolution of this issue is critical because there is a need for uni-
form treatment of the legal rights and duties of employers and
employees in the context of the nonunion workplace.23
This note will examine the applicability of the Weingarten
right to nonunion employees. First, it will address the scope of
the Weingarten decision with respect to concerted activity and
non-interference with legitimate employer prerogatives. Next, the
Board's decision and rationale for applying the Weingarten right
to nonunion employees will be analyzed. The Ninth Circuit's re-
fusal to extend the right to nonunion employees will also be
examined. This note concludes that the Weingarten right should
not apply to nonunion employees.
Id. at 1161. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73 for a discussion of the Interboro
doctrine.
23. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text. Prior to Weingarten, the Board and
the courts approached the issue of whether an employee is afforded a representative in a
number of ways. For example, in Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945), the
Board held that a union employee is entitled to representation. Relying upon section 7 of
the NLRA, the Board reasoned that the worker was entitled to a Board order finding a
grievance was not present and that there was therefore no reason to address the issue of
representation. NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947). The court
determined that the employee was discharged for insubordination. Id. at 613-14. Because
of the factual setting, this case is not entirely instructive of the Board's analysis of the
right to a representative. One reason the employee was called for an interview was
because she was a member of the union committee. Id. at 609.
The Board next confronted the issue of representation almost 20 years later in Dobbs
House, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964). In Dobbs House, the Board reversed its initial
determination in Ross Gear, holding that an employee has no statutory right to request a
representative. Id. at 1571.
In Texaco, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), the Board again deviated from its previous
decisions. The Board took the position that an employee has a statutory right to repre-
sentation based on section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with representa-
tives of his employees on mandatory subjects of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
The Board found the meeting at issue disciplinary in nature. Since a condition of
employment was involved, there was present a mandatory subject of bargaining. Texa-
co's rejection of the employee's request for a union representative violated section 8(a)(5)
because Texaco refused to bargain collectively on a mandatory subject of bargaining. 168
N.L.R.B. at 362. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Board's determination in Texaco, Inc. v.
NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
The Board switched from a section 8(a)(5) analysis to a section 7 analysis in Quality
Mfg., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972). Quality Mfg. summarily determined that the denial of a
union employee's request for union representation at an interview is a violation of the
employee's right to act in concert for the mutual aid and protection of the employee
group. The Board was quick to apply the section 7 analysis in J. Weingarten, Inc., 202
N.L.R.B. 446 (1973), and Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.LR.B. 1052 (1972). Relying on past cases,
the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits disagreed. See generally NLRB v. Quality Mfg.
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 15
BACKGROUND
The Weingarten Right
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,24 involved an employee, Laura
Collins, who worked as a sales clerk for a retail food chain. A
retail clerks union represented Collins for collective bargaining
purposes. After a fellow employee reported that Collins had
stolen money from the cash register, the store manager sum-
moned Collins for an interview in order to investigate the accu-
sations. 25 Collins requested a union representative at the inter-
view. The store manager denied the request and conducted the
interview as scheduled. 26 Collins filed an unfair labor practice
claim with the Board against the food chain, alleging that she
was denied her section 7 right to a union representative. 27 The
Board agreed with Collins and ordered the company to cease
and desist its practices. 28 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding
the Board's construction of section 7 impermissible. 29
The United States Supreme Court held that section 7 provides
a union employee the right to a union representative at an inves-
tigatory interview. 30 The Court reasoned that an employee's
request for representation fell within the scope of protection
afforded by section 731 because the request protects the interests
of the entire bargaining unit.32 The Court cited two reasons for
Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.
1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court, in Weingarten, accepted the Board's interpretation of the section 7
analysis. 420 U.S. at 260. The Weingarten Court also expressly overruled the Fifth Cir-
cuit's holding in Texaco, Inc., v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (1969).
24. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
25. Id. at 254.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 256.
28. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.LRB. 445, 450 (1973).
29. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1974). The Board construed
section 7 to include a union employee's request for representation, because the request
mutually aided and protected the other union employees. Id. at 1138. This decision was
based on the Board's decisions in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.RB. 197 (1972), and Mobil
Oil Corp., 196 N.LR.B. 1052 (1972).
30. 420 U.S. at 260.
31. Id. "The action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union
representative at a confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the literal word-
ing of section 7 that '[e]mployees shall have the right . .. to engage in ... concerted
activities for the purpose of... mutual aid or protection'." Id.
32. For purposes of the NLRA, the phrase "bargaining unit" is a term of art. Prior to
an election for representation, the Board must select an appropriate bargaining unit. 29
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its holding. First, the union representative safeguards the inter-
ests of other employees by contesting or thwarting an employer's
practice of meting out unjust punishment.33 Second, the presence
of a representative assures other employees that they too would
have the same right under similar circumstances.34 Further, the
Court indicated that the section 7 protection applies to an em-
ployee's request for a representative at an interview only if the
interview is held for the purpose of investigating the employee's
activities, and not if the purpose is to discipline the employee. 35
The Court stated that representation at an investigatory inter-
view protects and aids other employees, whereas an interview
which is conducted to impose discipline on an employee only
affects that particular employee.36
In resolving the issue before it, the Court established the scope
of the right.37 First, an employee may exercise the right only if
U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). There is often more than one appropriate bargaining unit; the
Board need not choose the best. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 281
(1972); NLRB v. Hudson River Aggregates, Inc., 639 F.2d 865,869 (2d Cir. 1981); NLRB v.
H.M. Patterson & Sons, Inc., 636 F.2d 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 1981).
33. 420 U.S. at 260-61. "The union representative whose participation he seeks is,
however, safeguarding not only the particular employee's interests, but also the interests
of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer
does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly." Id.
34. Id. at 261. 'The representative's presence is an assurance to other employees in
the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain his aid and protection if called upon to
attend a like interview." Id.
35. Historically, the Board and the courts have made a distinction between investiga-
tory and disciplinary interviews. In Texaco, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), the Board
found that a union employee has a right to a disciplinary interview. The Board based its
decisions on section 8(a)(5), which defines an unfair labor practice for employers who
refuse to bargain collectively with union representatives. Id. at 362. Immediately after
Texaco, the Board decided Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968), in which it
announced that sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) do not afford a union employee the right to a
union representative in an investigatory interview. The Fifth Circuit, in Texaco, cited
Jacobe-Pearson for this proposition. 408 F.2d at 142 (citing Jacobe-Pearson, 172 N.L.R.B.
at 594).
Other NLRB cases also follow this investigatory-disciplinary distinction. See, e.g.,
Lafayette Radio Elecs. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell Tel., 192 N.LRIB. 834
(1971).
The Supreme Court in Weingarten expressly overruled Texaco's proposition that sec-
tion 8(a)(1) does not afford a union employee an investigatory interview. 420 U.S. at 264.
The Court did not indicate whether Texaco's holding granting union employees a right to
representation at a disciplinary interview is still binding. The status of the issue is there-
fore unclear. A full analysis of the distinction is beyond the scope of this note. See gener-
ally Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L REv. 329 (1973-74).
36. 420 U.S. at 260-61.
37. The Court noted, "It is the province of the Board, not the courts, to determine
whether or not the 'need' [for a representative at an investigatory interview] exists in
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he requests representation prior to the interview. Failure to
request will result in waiver of the right.38 Waiver can occur
even when the employee does not exercise the right because he is
unaware of its existence. 39 Second, the employee's belief that the
investigation will result in disciplinary action must be based on
objective facts.40 Third, the exercise of the right may not inter-
fere with legitimate employer prerogatives. 41 An assertion of le-
gitimate employer authority enables the employer to cancel the
interview. 42 When the employer asserts such a prerogative, the
employer may give the employee the choice between conducting
the meeting without representation or not conducting the meet-
ing at all.43 Finally, the employer need not bargain with the
representative; the representative is only there to help clarify an
otherwise ambiguous situation.44
The Court explained that the right serves to effectuate the goal
of the NLRA because the request for representation equalizes the
bargaining power between employers and employees, thereby
easing industrial strife.45 Requiring an employee to attend an
interview conducted by the employer which the employee believes
will result in discipline would perpetuate the imbalance the
NLRA was designed to eliminate.
The Scope of Section 7 Concerted Activity
Weingarten held that section 7 affords a union employee the
right to request representation at an investigatory interview.46 In
light of changing industrial practices and the Board's cumulative experience in dealing
with labor-management relations." Id. at 266.
38. Id. at 257. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
39. 420 U.S. at 257.
40. Id. at 257-58. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
41. 420 U.S. at 258-59. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
42. 420 U.S. at 258-59.
43. Id. at 258. The Court quoted the Board's opinion in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B.
197, 198-99 (1972), which states that allowing an employee the choice is the only course
consistent with the provisions of the Act. This interpretation safeguards the employer's
right to run his own shop as well as the employees' right to protection by their exclusive
bargaining agent. "It permits the employer to reject a collective course in situations such
as investigatory interviews when a collective course is not required but protects the
employee's right to protection by their chosen agents." 420 U.S. at 258 (quoting Quality
Mfg., 195 N.LR.B. at 198-99).
44. 420 U.S. at 259.
45. Id. at 262. The NLRA drafters' goal was to eliminate the inequity of bargaining
power between employees and employers by allowing employees the freedom to bargain
collectively. 29 U.S.C § 151 (1982).
46. Id. at 260.
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Nonunion Employees
order to be protected by section 7,47 an employee must act con-
certedly, and this concerted activity must be for the mutual aid
or protection of other employees.48 Both the courts and the Board
have held that section 7 can apply to nonunion employees as
well as union employees if their activities satisfy this concerted
activity requirement. 49 Commentators have justified section 7's
concerted activity requirement on two grounds. One suggests
that Congress deemed a single employee's activity too insignifi-
cant to require protection. 50 Another explains that Congress
included the concerted activity requirement to encourage collec-
tive bargaining.5 1 Notwithstanding these varying justifications, the
concerted activity component is expressly stated in the statute.52
47. The history of section 7 sheds little light on its meaning. Common law regarded
employee group protests as unlawful conspiracies, the remedy for which was criminal
prosecution of the employees, and, later, injunctive relief for the employer. In contrast,
individual protests against employment conditions were lawful. See R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAw 2 (1976). The Sherman Antitrust Act, enacted in 1890, codified the
substance of the common law. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
The Clayton Act of 1914 was Congress's first attempt at exempting certain labor activi-
ties from the Sherman Act. Specifically, section 20 of the Clayton Act exempts from
injunctive actions peaceful devices such as work stoppages, picketing, and other activity
"whether engaged in singly or in concert." 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
Subsequent to its enactment of the Clayton Act, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, the policy of which supports the right of employees to act "in other concerted activi-
ties for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29
U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The provisions of the Clayton Act affording protection to individual
employees were eliminated, yet the legislative history reveals no reason for its deletion.
The National Labor Relations Act adopted verbatim the language of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Again, no reasons were articulated for the NLRA's failure to protect individual
employee activity. See Gorman & Finking, The Individual and the Requirement of "Con-
cert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 331-38 (1981). See
generally Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A
Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
49. See, e.g., Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., v. NLRB 622 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Em-
pire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977); United Merchants & Mfrs. v. NLRB, 554 F.2d
1276 (4th Cir. 1977); United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO
v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); NLRB v. Puerto Rico
Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961); Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B.
871 (1980); Go-Lightly Footwear, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 42 (1980); Savin Business Mach.
Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. 92 (1979); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350 (1978); Hansen Chev-
rolet, 237 N.LR.B. 584 (1978); American Arbitration Assoc., Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 71 (1979).
See also Gorman & Finking, supra note 47, at 329.
50. R. GORMAN, supra note 47, at 299.
51. Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 514, 529 (1953).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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The Weingarten Court based its holding on its finding that an
individual employee's request for representation constituted con-
certed activity.5 3 The employee in Weingarten, however, belonged
to a union.54 In addressing the issue of whether the Weingarten
right should be extended to nonunion employees, courts have
examined the scope of concerted activity in various factual
settings.55
Every federal circuit has adopted the basic premise that the
activity of an individual employee may under certain circum-
stances constitute concerted activity.5 6 These courts and the
Board have developed four standards to determine whether con-
certed activity, within the meaning of section 7, encompasses an
individual's activity.5 7
53. 420 U.S. at 254. The Court failed to address specifically how the one union
employee's request for representation constituted a concerted activity. See supra notes
31-34 and accompanying text.
54. 420 U.S. at 254.
55. Once the scope of concerted activity has been determined, one can analyze
whether a nonunion employee's request is within the definition. See Anchortank, Inc. v.
NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153,1158 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. See Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363,374(9th Cir. 1983) (recognized individ-
ual concerted activity but not when employee "acted for himself and by himself"); Road-
way Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 694 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The law in this circuit,
until stated differently by the court sitting en bane, adheres to the definition of concerted
activities announced in Mushroom Transportation."); Scooba Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 694 F.2d
82, 84 (5th Cir. 1982) ("IThe mere fact that an employee acts alone does not preclude
treatment of his action as a protected activity under the Act"); NLRB v. Town & Country
LP Gas Serv., 687 F.2d 187, 191 (7th Cir. 1982) (individual's grievance can be suffi-
ciently related to the union's collective objectives to come within section 7); NLRB v.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 1981) ("It is not necessary that an
individual employee be appointed or nominated by other employees to represent their
interests."); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980)
(employees refusal to operated crane for safety reasons deemed to be concerted); Krispy
Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1980) ("An action by a single
employee may be concerted even though participated in by a single employee."); Kohls v.
NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (truck driver who refused to drive truck for
safety reasons found not concerted because he failed to assert interest on behalf of
anyone other than himself); NLRB v. Sencore, Inc., 558 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1977)
(employee's activity of enlisting support for wage increase was for the mutual welfare of
other employees and therefore concerted); NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681,684-85
(10th Cir. 1977) (individual employee's solicitation for others to stop work held concerted);
Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 708 (1st Cir. 1975) (employee's pro-union state-
ments to management found concerted because he had other employee's interests in
mind); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1967)
(employee's attempt to enforce collective bargaining agreement found concerted despite
non-interest of other employees).
57. See generally Note, Protection of Individual Action as "Concerted Activity" Under
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The most restrictive approach holds that an individual acts
concertedly only if he or she acts on behalf of, or as a representa-
tive of, the other employees.58 The determination must rest on a
practical basis rather than a theoretical one.59 Thus, the em-
ployee acting as a spokesman, whether in an elected 60 or a
voluntary6' capacity, must represent an actual group of people.6 2
Consequently, application of this standard requires the partici-
pation of more than one employee to enable the activity to come
within the scope of concerted activity. 63
A less restrictive approach, enunciated in Mushroom Transpor-
tation Co. v. N.L.R.B.,64 holds that an individual's activity is
the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Protection of Individual Action]; Note, National Labor Relations Act Section 7:
Protecting Employee Activity Through Implied Concert of Action, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 813
(1981).
58. The leading case utilizing this approach is ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th
Cir. 1979). In ARO, the employee, Williams, worked as a temporary janitor-cleaner.
Because of the employer's financial difficulties, Williams was among several employees
discharged. Her discharge was pursuant to a company policy to discharge temporary
employees before discharging probationary employees hired for permanent positions.
After her discharge, Williams made numerous complaints to the company concerning the
order of discharge. Later, when the company was able to rehire old employees, the
employer refused to give Williams her job back because of her complaints. Williams
asserted that her complaints constituted concerted activity because they related to the
status of other temporary employees. The court disagreed, holding that Williams made
the complaints purely on her own behalf; while they might be related to the other
employees' status, they benefited only herself. Id. at 715. Accord Jim Causley Pontiac v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 123 (6th Cir. 1980); Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840,849 (2d
Cir. 1980); Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir.
1981); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980); Morrison-
Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411,413 (9th Cir. 1966).
59. ARO, 596 F.2d at 717.
60. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980) (elected
union employee representative suspended for acting as spokesman for the safety of the
bargaining unit held to have engaged in concerted activity).
61. Pelton Steel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 30-31 (7th Cir. 1980) (employee's com-
plaints about job rates and overtime held not concerted; court noted that a spokesman
need not be formally selected); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingam Elec. Co-op, 285 F.2d 8, 12
(6th Cir. 1960) (individual employee's complaints concerning a foreman appointment held
concerted activity where one group leader was not selected to voice complaints).
62. The group need not be in existence at the time. See Hugh H. Wilson v. NLRB, 414
F.2d 1345, 1349 (3d Cir. 1969) (employee's formation of a group to discuss a grievance
held concerted); Morrison-Knudson Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1966)
(employee's conduct in joining group action complaining about work conditions found to
be concerted activity).
63. ARO, 596 F.2d at 717.
64. 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). In Mushroom Transportation, Keeler, a non-regular
employee of the company, habitually advised other employees of their rights. The conver-
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concerted if the object of that activity is to initiate, induce, or
prepare for group action in the interest of the employees. This
approach recognizes that concerted activity must start with
some type of communication.65 If the NLRA denies this initial
communication, the employee's section 7 guarantees of the right
to organize and bargain collectively will never come to fru-
ition.66 A problem arises in distinguishing an employee's activ-
ity intending to induce group action from "mere griping." 67
Courts refuse to characterize "mere griping" as concerted activity.68
Thus, under the Mushroom Transportation approach, an indi-
vidual making a direct appeal to other employees is protected
under section 7 if the communication rises above the level of
everyday complaining. By contrast, the activity of an employee
who protests solely for his own benefit does not fall within the
protective scope of concerted activity even if the activity protects
other employees' benefits. 69
A more inclusive approach, the Interboro doctrine,70 protects
individual activity under section 7 if the employee's actions
attempt to implement an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment.71 This interpretation affords section 7 protection even if
the employee is acting for his own personal benefit, without
sations principally concerned holiday pay, vacations, and other company policies. The
Court found that Keeler was not trying to initiate group action and therefore his conver-
sations were unprotected.
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a concerted activity
although it involves only a speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it
must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the object of initiat-
ing or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to
group action in the interest of the employees.
Id. at 685.
65. Id. at 685.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Mushroom Transportation court reasoned that if the employee's conversa-
tion looks forward to no action at all it is likely to be simple complaining, which is not
protected under the NLRA. Id.
68. See Scooba Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 82,84 (5th Cir. 1982); Ontario Knife Co. v.
NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 618
F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980); Pelton Castrel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 29 (7th Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. See Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Empire
Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681,684 (10th Cir. 1977).
70. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
71. Id. at 499-500. In Interboro, the employee, hired as a steamfitter with a union
contract, complained that the company did not provide benefits guaranteed under the
contract. The court found that the employee was merely trying to enforce his rights under
the contract and that his activity was therefore concerted.
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regard for the interests of the other employees. 72 The Interboro
court reasoned that activities involving attempts to enforce pro-
visions of a collective bargaining agreement are an extension of
the concerted activity which gave rise to the original collective
bargaining agreement.73 Accordingly, a person seeking to enforce
a collective bargaining agreement does so by the express will of
those employees who are also under contract.
Early decisions by the Board represent the most expansive
interpretation of the scope of concerted activity.74 An employee's
activity was deemed concerted if it was of any potential benefit
to his co-employees. No showing of group action or of an existing
collective bargaining agreement was necessary.75 According to
the Board, the group benefits when one person acts for a com-
mon cause. This group benefit is sufficient to bring the activity
within the scope of section 7.76 The circuits have refused to adopt
this approach.77
72. Id. "[Alctivites involving attempts to enforce the provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement may be deemed to be concerted for purposes even in the absence of
such interest by fellow employees." Id.
73. Id. at 499. See also ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 716 (6th Cir. 1979); Keokuk
Gas Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 328, 333 (8th Cir. 1978).
74. See, e.g., St. Joseph's High School, 236 N.L.R.B. 1623, 1625 (1978), vacated on
other grounds, 248 N.L.R.B. 901 (1980) (teacher's action of circulation of report critical of
school shortly before accreditation team visited the school held to be concerted activity);
Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 39, 40 (1978) (employee's complaint about defective brakes
on employer's truck and refusal to drive truck found to be concerted); Akron Gen. Medical
Center, 232 N.L.R.B. 920, 920 (1977) (employee's complaint directly to employer, not to
state agency, concerning excess of lint and dust in the hospital laundry found to be con-
certed); Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975) (employee's complaint to the Cali-
fornia Occupational Safety and Health Agency concerning plant violations of state
safety regulations found to be concerted activity). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 47, at
299.
The Board has since overturned this expansive interpretation of concerted activity in
Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 73 (1984). In Meyers, the Board adopted an objective stand-
ard of concerted activity, stating that it is no longer sufficient in a showing of concerted
activity to set out the subject matter that is of alleged concern to a theoretical group. Id.
at 75.
75. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.LR.B. 999, 1000-01 (1975). See Note, Protection of
Individual Action, supra note 57, at 377-79.
76. See Bighorn Beverage, 236 N.L.R.B. 736, 752-53, enforcement denied, 614 F.2d
1238 (9th Cir. 1980); Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000-01 (1975).
77.
The only courts which have considered [it] have flatly rejected any rule that
where the complaint of a single employee relates to an alleged violation of fed-
eral or state safety laws and there is no proof of a purpose enlisting group
action in support of the complaint, there is "constructive concerted action."
Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 305,309 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing NLRB v.
C.I. Air Conditioning Inc., 496 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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Legitimate Employer Prerogatives
In addition to concerted activity, Weingarten requires that the
request for representation not interfere with legitimate employer
prerogatives.78 Under the common law, an employer has the
authority to discharge at will,79 absent the applicability of some
specific protection for the employee.80 This means that an em-
ployer may discharge an employee without reason or even for a
reason which is morally wrong.8' The employment at will doc-
trine is based upon a rule of contract law82 that requires a mani-
78. 420 U.S. at 258-59. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
79. This common law rule of termination at will first appeared in H. WOOD, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
80. In addition to section 7, the NLRA contains other provisions that protect employees
against inappropriate employer activites. For example, section 8(a) of the NLRA insu-
lates employees from employer behavior as follows:
8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it... ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this Act;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provision of section 9(a).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes an additional statutory protection
in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is vested with the authority
to prevent discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
The employee also has a contractual right to negotiate a just cause clause. See gener-
ally Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
118 (1976).
An analysis of the wide range of employee protections is beyond the scope of this note.
For a discussion of this issue, see generally Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404
(1967).
81. Examples of application of the discharge at will doctrine in American jurispru-
dence are countless. See generally, Blades, supra note 80, at 1404; Note, Protecting At
Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Comment, Protecting The Private Sector At Will
Employee Who "Blows The Whistle". A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinant of
Public Policy, 42 Wis. L. REV. 103 (1977).
82. During the eighteenth century in England and the United States, the hiring of
menial servants was presumed to be yearly. Employment relationships carried with them
duties and responsibilities for both master and servant. The master had the obligation to
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festation of consent as a prerequisite to enforcement of the con-
tract.83 If an employee desires a "just cause" provision,84 he
must demand that it be provided for in a written contract.8 5 The
doctrine can work to the employee's benefit as well. While the
employer has the option to discharge employees as he chooses,
the employee may quit in response to harsh working conditions
or to seek more gainful employment. 86
This employment at will concept functioned well to further
economic growth and entrepreneurship in the nineteenth centu-
ry.87 In the twentieth century, however, the economic and politi-
cal strength of the employer flourished, while that of the employee
diminished. 8 When the present power of an employer is com-
pared to that of an individual employee, a potential flaw emerges
in the employment at will rule which places the employee in a
provide food, shelter, and security for the servant while the servant was obligated to
perform the work for which he was hired.
The onset of the emerging theory of employment governed by contract law recast the
traditional relationship between master and servant. The new contract approach was to
bargain for each element of the employment relationship. The new theory forced the
employee to bear the responsibilities of his own needs and assume the risks of his own on
the job injuries. In addition to these added responsibilities, and based on contract theory,
the master-servant relationship emerged as terminable at will. See generally 2 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258-66; Feinman, supra note 80, at 118.
83. H. WOOD, supra note 79, § 134, at 272. "[I1f the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." Id. See also Feinman,
supra note 80, at 118.
84. A "just cause" provision limits the employer's right to discharge at will in that an
employee who has negotiated such provision in his contract may not be fired for ulterior
purposes. Also prohibited are discharges for no reason and discharges erroneously
believed by the employer to be justified. See generally Note, Discharge in the "Law" of
Arbitration, 20 VAND. L. REV. 81 (1966).
85. "Various social and economic factors have been suggested for this rapid accep-
tance. Among those hypothesized are the 19th century's development of freedom to con-
tract and the concomitant socio-economic concepts of freedom of enterprise and laissez-
faire." Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the
Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 18 Wisc. L. REV.
782.
86. Blades, supra note 80, at 1409.
87. See Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. 467, 470 (1980).
88. The findings and policies of the NLRA established that Congress enacted it to
deal with the inequality in bargaining power between employees and employers.
The denial by some employers of the right to organize and the refusal of some
employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and
other forms of industrial strife or unrest .... The inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow
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somewhat inequitable bargaining position. An employer can
discharge an employee arbitrarily, but an employee, for practical
reasons, is often restricted from quitting.8 9
Unions and courts have made inroads into the employment at
will doctrine which safeguard both union and nonunion employ-
ees against this potential inequity. Union employees are pro-
tected against arbitrary discharge by just cause provisions typi-
cally found in collective bargaining agreements.9 0 For nonunion
employees, the tort of retaliatory discharge provides a measure
of protection.9 1 This tort grants an employee a cause of action if
his employer discharges him in contravention of public policy.92
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE WEINGARTEN
RULE TO NONUNION EMPLOYEES
Materials Research
The Board first squarely faced the issue of whether Wein-
of commerce ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
89. High unemployment and a constricted economy are among the practical reasons
an employee is restricted from quitting. An employer can often fire an employee and be
certain that another employee is willing to do the same job. See Blackburn, supra note 87,
at 470.
90. See Blades, supra note 80, at 1409.
91. California was the first state in the country to recognize the retaliatory discharge
cause of action, and did so in Petermann v. Teamsters Local, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959). Most states adopting the tort have relied on this case, disregarding the
fact that Petermann included a contract action.
92. States which have recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge are: Illinois, Kelsay
v. Motorola, 74 Il. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Indiana, Frampton v. Central Ind. Steel,
260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Michigan, Sventko v. Kroger, 69 Mich. App. 644, 245
N.W.2d 151 (1976); Oregon, Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087 (Sup. Ct. Or. 1978)
(en banc); and Texas, Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
The states which have recognized retaliatory discharge have carved out a public policy
exception to the employment at will rule. The courts created this exception to enable
employees to effectuate public policy without fear of reprisal. The Supreme Court of Illi-
nois noted that the "Achilles heel" of retaliatory discharge lies in the definition of public
policy. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876,
878 (1981). See generally Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust DismissaL
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
Courts have used various other approaches to circumvent the employment at will doc-
trine. Some courts have implied a contractual right for an employer to termninate an
employee in good faith. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
Other states have used a theory of promissory estoppel. Under this guise, an employer
can be estopped from firing an employee even though the employee is an employee at
will. See, e.g., Stevens v. G.L. Reego & Sons, 209 F.2d 135 (Mass. 1954); Lubrecht v. Laurel
Stripping Co., 387 Pa. 393, 127 A.2d 687 (1956).
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garten applies to nonunion employees in Materials Research.93
The Materials Research Corporation had given its nonunion
employees a new work schedule, to commence the following day.
During their lunch break, three employees together spoke to the
supervisor and department manager and suggested a group
meeting between employees and management to discuss the
sudden change in procedure. 94 Both the supervisor and the de-
partment manager denied their request. Later that afternoon,
after discovering that one of the employees, Steve Hochman, had
organized the other two employees to speak with management,
the supervisor summoned Hochman for an interview95 to inves-
tigate why Hochman had organized the other two employees.
The supervisor denied Hochman's request for representation at
the investigatory interview.96
The Board held that the Weingarten right applied to nonunion
employees. 97 Since section 7 guarantees the Weingarten right 98
93. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982). There have since been numerous Board decisions which
follow the holding of Materials Research. See, e.g., Davis Coal Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 190
(1983); E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 262 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1982); Interstate Security Serv., 263
N.L.R.B. 6 (1982); Bodolay Packaging Mach., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 320 (1982); McLean
Hosp., 264 N.L.R.B. 459 (1982); Valley West Welding Co., Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 204 (1982);
Tokheim Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 210 (1982).
To date, E.I du Pont is the only case which has been overturned on appeal. See 707
F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983); infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text. The Board and the
courts had addressed this issue in cases decided prior to Materials Research, but none of
the cases involved the specific question of whether a nonunion employee is allowed the
Weingarten right. See, e.g., NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976) (union
employee's right to investigatory interview upheld); O.C. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union,
AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (employee's right to union representa-
tion upheld where neither a union contract existed nor established grievance procedure);
Illinois Bell Tel., 251 N.L.R.B. 932 (1980) (employer allowed a representative at employee's
investigatory interview but stated that the representative had to be a union steward and
not merely a fellow union employee); Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 430 (1978), affirmed,
618 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (5th Cir. 1980) (court recognized employee's right to union repre-
sentation at an investigatory interview held during the hiatus between the union's chal-
lenged victory in a representative election and its subsequent certification as a bargain-
ing representative); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978), remanded on other
grounds, 592 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 241 N.L.R.B. 248, enforced, 600 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1979) (employee's right to a union representative in contested union victory upheld); New-
ton Sheet Metal, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 970 (1978), enforced, 598 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1979)
(employee's right to union representative when union representational status is in ques-
tion upheld).
94. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1010.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1010-11.
97. Id. at 1010.
98. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. The Board asserted that the Wein-
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and section 7 covers both union and nonunion employees, 99 the
Board concluded that the right therefore extended to nonunion
as well as union employees. 00 The requisite concert element of
section 7 was found to exist in the effect of Hochman's request
for representation. 01 Specifically, the Board found that the repre-
sentative's protection against arbitrary or unjust action and the
assurance to other employees that they may also obtain the
assistance of a representative in an investigatory interview,
created the concert element. The Board determined that this
effect did not change in the context of nonunion workers, and,
therefore, the activity of the nonunion employees also possessed
the necessary concert element. Thus, the Weingarten right was
held to apply to Hochman.I0 2
The Board also stated that the application of the right to non-
union employees effectuates the fundamental purpose of the
NLRA.10 3 Since the purpose of the NLRA is to eliminate the
inequality of bargaining power between employers and employ-
ees,10 4 the employees' right to freely associate and independently
organize is protected. Representatives help to eliminate the
inequality by providing support for the employee who must face
management alone. The Board held that the need for repre-
sentation does not depend on whether the employee belongs to a
union.105 The need for support in an investigatory interview
may be even greater for nonunion workers because they have
neither the benefit of a collective bargaining agreement nor the
protection of arbitration procedures.
garten use of the term "union representative" merely depicts the facts presented in the
case. The use of the term, the Board found, in no way was intended to limit the right
recognized in Materials Research. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012.
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
100. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1011. The Board did not inquire into why the union employee's
request for representation in Weingarten fell within the scope of section 7. The Board
neglected to investigate why a union employee's request for representation constitutes
concerted activity. A fuller analysis reveals that the union activity is the very reason why
the request constitutes concerted activity. The nonunion activity lacks this element. See
infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
101. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1013.
102. Id. at 1010.
103. Id. at 1014.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
105. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1014. The Board relied on its previous decision in Glomac Plas-
tics, Inc., 234 N.LR.B. 1309 (1978). "Our own reading of Weingarten and Quality per-
suades us that the Court's primary concern was the right of employees to have some
measure of protection against unjust employer practices, particularly those which threaten
job security. These employee concerns obtain whether or not the employees are repre-
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Nonunion Employees
Although the need for support was apparent, the Board recog-
nized that, in the absence of a union, nonunion workers look to
each other for their mutual aid and protection. 10 6 Further, the
Board asserted that a co-employee acting in a representative
capacity can serve the same purpose as the union representative:
to prevent the employer from overpowering a lone employee.10 7
The Board reasoned that a co-employee fulfills this purpose even
if he does nothing more than witness the interview.10 8
The dissent, however, reasoned that a nonunion employee's
representative would not be able to fulfill the function of a repre-
sentative as set out by the court in Weingarten.10 9 The dissent
stated that a nonunion employee would be likely to choose a
friend to represent him at the investigatory interview who would
be just as unskilled as the employee under investigation and who
also would be emotionally involved. The dissent concluded that a
co-employee possesses no more ability to confront management,
clarify issues, or expose facts concerning the investigation than
the employee requesting the representative. °10
E. I. du Pont de Nemours
The Board decided Materials Research and E. I. du Pont de
Nemours v. NLRB 1 I on the same day. E. I. du Pont had docked
an employee's pay because the employee visited a doctor on
company time without authorization. '1 2 The employee, Henry
Burke, was working in a nonunion shop, and refused to sign his
sented by a union . Id. at 1311.
106.
[E]mployees in an unrepresented unit must look to each other for whatever mu-
tual aid or protection they can muster in the face of unjust or arbitrary
employer action. Indeed, when confronted with the prospect of an investigatory
interview which might result in discipline, the only assistance readily available
to the unrepresented employee lies in fellow employees, and an employee
attempt to enlist that type of protection is precisely what the act is designed to
safeguard.
262 N.L.R.B. at 1014.
The Board also used this reasoning in Glomac Plastics, 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311.
107. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
108. Id. at 1014-15.
109. Id. at 1021 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. 262 N.LR.B. 1040 (1982). The Board affirmed the administrative judge's ruling
without discussion, noting its decision of Materials Research.
112. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).
19841
Loyola University Law Journal
timecard acknowledging the deduction. Burke was subsequently
suspended." ' The following day, a supervisor summoned Burke
for an interview, in which he read to Burke his record of perform-
ance deficiencies. Burke attended the interview, but refused to
acknowledge that he had been read the contents of the perform-
ance record.114 The supervisor then called a second-level man-
ager to witness the interview. Burke requested that he be pro-
vided with either a copy of the performance deficiencies or an
employee witness. The supervisor denied the request. 15
Based on its analysis in Materials Research, the Board held
that Burke was entitled to a representative at the interview.11 6
The Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, find-
ing that the nonunion employee's request did not come within
the definition of concerted activity.117 The court interpreted sec-
tion 7 to require, as separate elements, both concerted activity
and mutual aid or protection. 18 As in Weingarten, the mutual
aid or protection element was established by the benefit the
request for representation conferred on the other employees.
According to the Ninth Circuit, however, the isolated conduct of
a single nonunion employee in requesting representation did not
establish the concert element, even though the conduct may aid
and protect other employees.1 9 In contrast to the nonunion
employee's conduct, the court explained that a union employee's
request for representation constituted concerted activity simply
as a result of the presence of the union. Employees organized the
union through concerted activity and the union presently guar-
113. Id. at 1077.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 262 N.LR.B. at 1016.
117. 707 F.2d at 1079.
118. Id. at 1078. The court stated that it was following the Ninth Circuit's precedent in
requiring the separate elements of concerted activity and mutual aid and protection, cit-
ing NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980). In Bighorn Beverage, an
employee's filing of a safety complaint concerning carbon monoxide fumes in the work-
place was held not to be concerted activity. The court found that the complaint properly
alleged the element of mutual aid and protection, but because the employees acted alone,
the concerted activity element was lacking. Id. at 1242.
The court also dealt with one commentator's criticism of the artficiality of the construc-
tion of section 7 that results in protection for an activity engaged in by two employees,
whereas the same activity engaged in by one employee is unprotected. The artificiality,
the court responded, "is one decided upon by Congress when it drafted section 7. It is not
a choice that can be undone by courts for policy reasons." 707 F.2d at 1078.
119. 707 F.2d at 1078.
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anteed that concerted activity would follow a request for help.
The union employee's request for a representative constituted
concerted activity because it was supported by the group activity
of the union.120
The court expressly stated that the decision did not necessarily
preclude a finding of concerted activity in a nonunion setting. 121
A nonunion employee must show a backdrop of group activity,
however, to convert his individual request for representation into
concerted activity.122 Since section 7 applies to nonunion em-
ployees, the court reasoned that the backdrop of group activity
would be necessary to transform the nonunion employee's request
into concerted activity. The E. I. du Pont employee did not estab-
lish evidence of group activity. Thus, the court denied enforce-
ment of the Board's order.123
ANALYSIS:
THE WEINGARTEN RIGHT As APPLIED TO
NONUNION EMPLOYEES
Four reasons militate against applying the Weingarten right
to nonunion employees. First, a request for representation, absent
a union or other group activity, is not concerted activity within
the definition of section 7.124 Second, the right interferes with an
employer's prerogative to discharge employees at will. 125 Third, a
co-employee lacks the ability to perform the professional function
required of a representative at an investigatory interview. 26 Fi-
nally, the right may actually work to the detriment of both
employer and employee. 127
In order to come within the protection of section 7, an employee
must act both for the mutual aid or protection of other employees
and in concert with other employees. 128 The Weingarten court
determined that an employee's request for representation at an
investigatory interview satisfies section 7's requirements 29 be-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1079.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1080.
124. See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
127. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)
129. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1975). See supra notes 33-34
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cause the representative safeguards the interests of the entire
bargaining unit by contesting the employer's procedure for met-
ing out punishment. Additionally, the court noted that a repre-
sentative assures the employees of the bargaining unit that they
may also obtain the aid of a representative if they are summoned
to attend an investigatory interview. 130 Although these assuran-
ces satisfy the mutual aid or protection requirement of section 7,
they do not appear to satisfy the requirement of concerted activi-
ty.131 It is unclear why the Weingarten Court considered the
request for representation as constituting concerted activity; how-
ever, it is probable that the presence of the union established the
concerted component.
A union employee's request for a union representative consti-
tutes concerted activity because of the inherent nature of unions.
A union is defined as employees acting in concert. 32 The major-
ity of the employees must vote for and consent to a union repre-
sentative. 133 As a result, the union acts as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent of the employees in the bargaining unit.1 34 A union
therefore epitomizes the concert element.
Because nonunion employees who request representation lack
this built-in concert component, an employee must establish the
concert element through alternative means.135 As noted above,
the Board and reviewing courts have adopted varying interpre-
tations of the meaning of "concerted activity."'136 It is necessary
to examine all four interpretations of concerted activity to deter-
mine whether it is appropriate for a court to define a nonunion
employee's request for representation as concerted activity.
The most restrictive interpretation of concerted activity requires
that the employee act on behalf of, or as a representative of,
other employees. 137 The employee's activity does not come within
the protection of section 7 if it benefits the others in a merely
theoretical sense. That the most restrictive interpretation of con-
and accompanying text.
130. 420 U.S. at 263-64.
131. The court in E.I. du Pont de Nemour & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.
1983), articulated this criticism. Id. at 1078.
132. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1152, 1161 (8th Cir. 1980).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1982).
134. Id. § 160.
135. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 707 F.2d at 1078.
136. See supra notes 47-77 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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certed activity does not apply to a nonunion employee's request
for representation is best illustrated as follows: An employee who
is called in for an investigation interview regarding allegations
of theft is concerned about saving his job. To combat the allega-
tions of theft, the employee seeks a representative for support
against the power of management. Since his primary concern is
saving his own job, helping his fellow employees is, at best, a
peripheral consideration. Any benefit accruing to other employees
from his actions is, in all likelihood, purely theoretical. The most
restricted interpretation of concerted activity therefore does not
encompass a nonunion employee's request for representation be-
cause any connection between such a request and any actual
benefit which might accrue to his fellow employees is too attenu-
ated to deserve section 7 protection.
The Mushroom Transportation definition of concerted activity
includes conduct by an individual employee for the purpose of
initiating, inducing, or preparing for group action.138 A typical
activity which comes within this definition occurs when an employee
calls for a machine shutdown or strike. 139 In contrast to this
definition, the employee in the previous example is not trying to
initiate, induce, or prepare for group action. Rather, he requests
help to defeat allegations of his own misconduct with the sole
aim of saving his job. He anticipates no group action to combat
the claims against him. Mushroom Transportation thus does not
afford this nonunion employee the right to request representa-
tion because his activity involves no group action.
The Interboro doctrine provides that an individual's actions
constitute concerted activity if the individual seeks the enforce-
ment of a collective bargaining agreement. 40 Because no collec-
tive bargaining agreement exists in the above example, the
Interboro doctrine would not grant this nonunion worker the
right to representation.
The most expansive approach formerly adopted by the Board
recognizes concerted activity where the effect of the individual's
activity benefits the other employees. 41 Weingarten held that
138. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Pelton Pastrel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1980); Ontario Knife
Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1973).
140. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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the effect of the request for a representative benefitted other
employees by contesting an employer practice of punishing un-
justly and by assuring other employees the same right of repre-
sentation. Therefore, this earlier interpretation of concerted activi-
ty encompasses a nonunion employee's request for represen-
tation. Although the Board's former interpretation grants non-
union employees the Weingarten right, the Board misinterpreted
section 7 by considering only whether the effect of the request
benefitted other employees, therefore satisfying only the mutual
aid or protection component. The Board simply did not address
the concert element of section 7.
Even if the courts were to adopt the Board's former interpreta-
tion of concerted activity, further analysis demonstrates the
inapplicability of the Weingarten right to nonunion employees.
Weingarten held that the request for representation may not
interfere with employer authority. The right of a nonunion em-
ployee to request a representative, however, interferes with the
legitimate employer prerogative to discharge an employee at
will.
14 2
The employer's common law right to deal with employees uni-
laterally gives the employer the right to discharge his employees
at will.143 If a nonunion employee were to possess the Wein-
garten right to request representation, however, the employer
could not discharge the employee for exercising that right.1 44
Expanding the Weingarten right to include nonunion employees
thus carves out an exception to the common law rule. Wein-
garten expressly stated that interference with an employer's le-
gitimate prerogatives terminates the right. 45 The right to fire at
will is such a prerogative.
In addition to circumventing the employer prerogative to fire
at will, the nonunion employee's representative, typically a co-
employee, is not likely to have the knowledge or ability to fulfill
the functions of a representative as contemplated by Weingar-
ten.146 The Weingarten court referred to the representative as
142. Weingarten, 20 U.S. at 258. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
144. Generally, union employees cannot be discharged at will because most collective
bargaining agreements include just cause provisions. Therefore, this consideration only
comes into play with respect to nonunion employees. See Blades, supra note 80, at 1408.
145. 420 U.S. at 258.
146. Id.
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knowledgeable. 147 The representative is supposed to assist the
employee who lacks the ability to confront management by clari-
fying facts and supporting the employee.148 In all probability, a
nonunion employee who would act as representative lacks the
knowledge and experience for which the union representative is
trained. As articulated in Materials Research, the nonunion
employee is likely to choose a friend to represent him who is as
unskilled as the employee requesting the representative. 149
Finally, the Weingarten right inhibits the employer's ability to
fire ineffective employees. Because the requirement of a represen-
tative operates in derogation of the common law employment at
will rule, an employer would be faced with a built-in just cause
provision for the nonunion worker. This could weigh heavily on
the employer because employees could threaten to file suit for
frivolous reasons. An employer's ability to run a business profit-
ably and efficiently would be greatly inhibited if he feared an
impending suit and punitive damages every time he discharged
an employee. As a result of this fear, the employer could be
saddled with an ineffective employee. 150
The nonunion employee is also placed in a less equitable posi-
tion as a result of the Weingarten right. If an employer dis-
charges a nonunion employee subsequent to the employee's re-
quest for representation, the employer may face charges of violat-
ing section 7. Under Weingarten, an employer who wants to
avoid possible unfair labor practice charges can simply abolish
the interview altogether. Absent the interview, although the
employer is left to other less reliable means to investigate the
situation, the employee is also without an opportunity to answer
the accusations. For example, the employee in Weingarten would
not have been afforded the chance to explain the circumstances
surrounding the alleged stealing; the employee in E.I. du Pont
would not have been able to explain his reasons for going to the
doctor. Worse yet, the employer who does not want to deal with a
representative at an interview can instead fire at will any non-
union employee who he suspects is causing trouble. In contrast,
if the employee did not possess the Weingarten right, the employer
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Materials Research, 262 N.LRB. at 1019.
150. This reasoning appears in the dissent of Palmateer v. Internationl Harvester Co.,
85 IH. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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would not be threatened with a possible section 7 violation for
denying representation and could thus hold an interview with
the unrepresented employee. At the interview, the employee could
explain any allegations of misconduct. With the right, the policy
of the NLRA to eliminate the inequality of bargaining power is
thereby hindered rather than helped.
CONCLUSION
Weingarten held that a union employee is afforded the right to
request a representative because the request is concerted activity,
it does not interfere with employer prerogatives, and the union
representative is knowledgeable. These considerations are not
present when applied to a nonunion employee. The request for
representation, absent a union, is not a concerted activity within
the section 7 definition. The request interferes with the nonunion
employer's prerogative to discharge at will. The co-employee is
not likely to function as the knowledgeable professional required
in Weingarten. Additionally, the right works to both the employ-
ee's and employer's detriment. Nonunion employees, therefore,
should not be entitled to the Weingarten right.
JEANINE M. JIGANTI
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